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notice or hearing be the norm where a creditor seeks to employ the
legal processes of a state to protect his valid interests. Mitchell pres-
ents a more realistic approach to the problems encountered in the
typical creditor-debtor relationship than did the narrow standard
espoused in Fuentes. The prior hearing, which in the majority of cases
is never utilized by the defaulting debtor,5" was unnecessarily given
sacrosanct constitutional status. The Mitchell "accommodation" test
recognizes that mutual property interests" deserve more than one-
sided protection and prevents invalidation of efficient creditors' rem-
edies.
Greg Guidry
THE NUNCUPATIVE TESTAMENT BY PUBLIC ACT: A DYING DECLARATION?
When a nuncupative testament by public act,' executed by Mrs.
Freddie Robertson Killingsworth,' was challenged by certain of her
legal heirs not named as beneficiaries,3 the legatees under the will
brought an action seeking a declaration of its validity.' On original
hearing, the Louisiana supreme court declared the will invalid, bas-
ing its decision on evidence which indicated that the notary's secre-
tary had typed the will, thereby violating the codal requirement that
the testament be written "by the notary."5 On rehearing, the court
52. "Offering the debtor an opportunity to be heard does not guarantee the debtor
will avail himself of the opportunity. The Survey [Collection Practices and Creditors'
Remedies Survey] showed that in approximately 65 percent of all court cases the
consumer failed to appear and judgment was entered by default for the creditor-
plaintiff." REPORT OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON CONSUMER FINANCE, CONSUMER
CREDIT IN THE UNITED STATES 30 (1972).
53. "Indeed, depending on the number of installments which have been paid, the
creditor's interest may often be greater than the debtor's. Thus we deal here with
mutual property interests, both of which are entitled to be safeguarded. Fuentes over-
looked this vital point." Mitchell v. W.T. Grant Co., 94 S. Ct. 1895, 1910 n.3 (1974)
(Powell, J., concurring).
1. LA. CIv. CODE arts. 1577, 1578.
2. The will was executed on October 7, 1955.
3. These legal heirs would have inherited nothing under the will, but would have
received 5/S's of Mrs. Killingsworth's estate had the will been declared invalid.
4. The legatees under the will enjoyed almost the entire estate of Mrs. Killing-
sworth. They were also legal heirs, however, and would have enjoyed approximately
3/8's of Mrs. Killingsworth's estate had the will been declared invalid.
5. LA. CIv. CODE art. 1578: "The nuncupative testaments by public act must be
received by a notary public, in presence of three witnesses residing in the place where
the will is executed, or of five witnesses not residing in the place.
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ruled the evidence inadmissible, thus reversing its declaration of in-
validity' without altering its previously expressed interpretation of
the Code's notarial writing requirement. Succession of Killingsworth,
292 So.2d 536 (La. 1974).
Corollary to the right of ownership is the right of testamentary
disposition.7 Thus, the available forms of disposition should allow the
testator's wishes to be given their full effect. The nuncupative testa-
ment by public act is one of the five testamentary forms available in
Louisiana," and has been used to effect mortis causa dispositions from
the earliest days of the state's codal regime.
The provisions of the Louisiana Civil Code dealing with the nun-
cupative testament by public act reflect their French heritage., Be-
"This testament must be dictated by the testator, and written by the notary as it
is dictated.
"It must then be read to the testator in presence of the witnesses.
"Express mention is made of the whole, observing that all those formalities must
be fulfilled at one time, without interruption, and without turning aside to other acts."
(Emphasis added.)
6. The court thus found nothing to contradict the testament which was regular
on its face. LA. CIv. CODE art. 1647: "Nuncupative testaments received by public acts
do not require to be proved, that their execution may be ordered; they are full proof of
themselves, unless they are alleged to be forged." It is well settled that recitals of a
nuncupative testament by public act must be considered as proved until disproved.
Renfrow v. McCain, 185 La. 135, 168 So. 753 (1936); Succession of Block, 131 La. 101,
59 So. 29 (1912); Succession of Papa, 192 So. 2d 854 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1966). Thus a
strong though rebuttable presumption favoring the validity of such a testament is
created where it appears on its face to have complied with all the formalities required
by law.
7. Kingsbury v. Whitaker, 32 La. Ann. 1055, 1067 (1880). A flexible means of
testamentary disposition was provided through subsequent legislation enacting the
statutory will. Such a testament may be typewritten, printed, mimeographed, or writ-
ten in any other manner. See LA. R.S. 9:2442 (Supp. 1953).
8. (1) LA. CIv. CODE art. 1578 (nuncupative testament by public act); (2) LA. Civ.
CODE art. 1581 (nuncupative testament by private act); (3) LA. CIv. CODE art. 1584
(mystic testament); (4) LA. Civ. CODE art. 1588 (olographic testament); (5) LA. R.S.
9:2442-44 (Supp. 1952), as amended by La. Acts 1964, No. 437 § 1 (statutory will). R.S.
9:2444 was repealed by La. Acts 1970, No. 475 § 2. It is now found in LA. CODE CIv. P.
art. 2890. Also R.S. 9:2442 has been amended by La. Acts 1974, No. 246, to require
that the will have a date, to require witnesses to have the minimum qualifications
under article 1591 and 1592 of the Civil Code of 1870, and to clarify the requirements
for the signing of the will and the attestation clause.
9. Article 1574 of the Louisiana Civil Code of 1870 is derived from article 969 of
the Code Napoleon of 1804; articles 1575 and 1577 have no corresponding articles in
the Code Napoleon. Article 1578 of the Civil Code was formerly articles 971 and 972 of
the Code Napoleon; article 1579 was formerly article 973 of the Code Napoleon; article
1580 was formerly article 974 of the Code Napoleon. Article 1647 of the Civil Code has
no corresponding article in the Code Napoleon. Article 1656 of the Civil Code, repealed
by La. Acts 1960, No. 30 § 2 and replaced by article 2882 of the Louisiana Code of
Civil Procedure, also has no corresponding article in the Code Napoleon.
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cause the notary was of the literate minority of the populace at the
time of the confection of the Code Napoleon, he was considered the
appropriate person to transcribe this testament." While Louisiana
Civil Code articles dealing with the nuncupative testament by public
act have remained basically unchanged, the corresponding French
articles have undergone legislative revision to reflect technological
advances and modern office practice," and consequently a major dis-
parity has developed between the French and Louisiana rules govern-
ing this form of disposition.2 However, in both jurisdictions the es-
sence of the nuncupative testament by public act is still the double
protection afforded by (1) oral execution, (2) in the presence of com-
petent witnesses, 3 evidenced by a notarial instrument. Specific for-
malities for this self-proving testament are set out in Civil Code arti-
cle 1578." 4
10. CODE NAPOLEON art. 972 (1804).
11. French Law of 25 Ventose An XI.
12. Under the revised French provisions, the notary may write this type of testa-
ment himself, or cause it to be written by a third person. It may be written either by
hand or mechanically. FRENCH CIV. CODE art. 972. Cf. LA. CIv. CODE art. 1578 which
states that this testament must be "written by the notary .... " "Written" has been
judicially interpreted to include typewriting. Prudhomme v. Savant, 150 La, 256, 90
So. 640 (1922). For discussion of the French and Louisiana codal provisions for the
nuncupative testament by public act, see 10 AUBRY & RAU, DROIT CIVIL FRANCAIS § 670
(6th ed. Esmein 1954) in-C. LAZARUS, 3 CIVIL LAW TRANSLATIONS 149 (1969) [hereinafter
cited as AUBRY & RAU].
13. "[Ais the will must . . . be read to the testator in the presence of the same
witnesses, at the same interview, the law has provided a double safeguard against both
honest mistakes and dishonest practices." Succession of Wilkin, 21 La. Ann. 115, 116
(1869). See also Langley's Heirs v. Langley's Executors, 12 La. 114 (1838).
14. (1) It must be written by a notary; (2) It must be received by the notary in
presence of three witnesses residing in the place where the will is executed, or in
presence of five witnesses not residing in the place; (3) It must be dictated by the
testator to the notary in presence of the witnesses; (4) It must be read to the testator
in presence of the witnesses; (5) It must be expressed in the will that all the formalities
are complied with; (6) All these formalities must be fulfilled at one time and without
interruption. LA. CIv. CODE art. 1578. Additionally, the testament must be signed by
the testator or, if he declares that he cannot, his declaration must be expressed in the
will and mention made of the cause that hinders him from signing. Id. art. 1579. It
must also be signed by the witnesses, or at least by one of them for all, if the others
cannot write. Id. art. 1580.
For an excellent discussion of the requirements of this type of will, see AUBRY &
RAU § 670; L. OPPENHEIM, SUCCESSIONS AND DONATIONS § 195 in 10 LOUISIANA CIVIL LAW
TREATISE 294 (1973). See also Oppenheim, The Testate Succession, 36 TuL. L. REV. 1
(1961); The Institutes of Christian Roselius, 38 TuL. L. REV. 497, 527 (1964); Comment,
12 TUL. L. REV. 439, 440-41 (1938).
A plausible interpretation of the comments by Professor Oppenheim regarding the
requirements of this type of testament indicate that it is necessary for there to be
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These formalities have been viewed as a matter of substance, 5
with deviation usually giving rise to invalidity." Some deviation has
been permitted, however, when the courts find that trustworthiness
has not been sacrified.' 7 For example, strict interpretation of the
.clause requiring the testament to be written by the notary "as it is
dictated""' would appear to require verbatim recordation simultane-
ous to the dictation. Nevertheless, in Succession of Beattie5 the court
allowed reception of the dictation as a whole and later transcription
from memory. This was justified by "the policy of our law to carry
out the wishes of deceased persons and not to push the legal require-
ments . . . to extremes."" Sanction has also been given to the para-
phrasing of the testator's words."' In yet another decision,
Prudhomme v. Savant," the court held that a nuncupative testament
by public act was valid even though it had been entirely typewritten
express mention made in the testament that it was signed by the testator and that it
was signed by the witnesses, or at least by one of them for all. However, it seems the
applicable codal provisions neither express nor imply such requirements.
15. Comment, 36 TUL. L. REv. 1, 4 (1961); Comment, 12 TUL. L. REV. 439, 446
(1938).
16. LA. Civ. CODE art. 1595: "The formalities, to which testaments are subject by
the provisions of the present section, must be observed; otherwise the testaments are
null and void." See also LA. CIv. CODE art. 1578. The Louisiana supreme court quoted
approvingly from 68 CORPUS JURIS § 276 in stating that "[any material deviation
from the manner of execution prescribed by statute will be fatal to the validity of the
will" notwithstanding the absence, suggestion or intimation of fraud. Soileau v. Or-
tego, 189 La. 713, 718, 180 So. 496, 497 (1938).
17. In Godden v. Executors of Burke, 35 La. Ann. 160 (1883), a witness read to
the testator from a memorandum made up the previous day by the notary after instruc-
tions by the testator. The testator then repeated the words as uttered to the notary in
the presence of the other witnesses since he was not able from some transient cause to
read the manuscript. The court found compliance with the requirement that the testa-
ment be "dictated by the testator." In Segur's Heirs v. Segur, 12 La. 25 (1838), the
provision stating that the testament must be "written by the notary as it is dictated"
was held to be complied with when the notary made a written memorandum from
dictation, left the bedside of the testatrix, paused to mend his pen and speak with the
universal legatee and one of the witnesses, and then wrote out the will from the
memorandum. See also Succession of Beattie, 163 La. 831, 112 So. 802 (1927).
18. LA. Civ. CODE art. 1578.
19. 163 La. 831, 112 So. 802 (1927). The court held that the testament had been
"dictated by the testat[rixl" when the bedridden testatrix dictated her entire will to
the notary, who made mental note thereof and repaired to a small table placed at the
foot of the bed where he made the transcription of her disposition. See also Segur's
Heirs v. Segur, 12 La. 25 (1838).
20. Succession of Beattie, 163 La. 831, 838, 112 So. 802, 804 (1927).
21. Rostrup v. Succession of Spicer, 183 La. 1087, 1092, 165 So. 307, 308 (1936):
"it is 'identity of thoughts and not of words which the law requires.' "
22. 150 La. 256, 90 So. 640 (1922). See also Tate, Techniques of Judicial Interpre-
tation in Louisiana, 22 LA. L. REV. 727, 734 (1962).
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by the notary. It was reasoned that since the typewriter had not been
invented at the time of the adoption of the Louisiana Civil Code, the
redactors obviously did not intend to exclude that mode of transcrip-
tion by use of the term "written."23 Consequently, a will typed by the
notary is considered "written" by him within the meaning of the
Code. Additionally, it has been suggested that the testator himself
may read the transcription back aloud,24 though a technical construc-
tion of the article would imply that it must be read to him. 5
While the testamentary accuracy guaranteed by this type of dis-
position would be undermined by material deviation," such as per-
mitting incompetent witnesses to attest to the validity of the testa-
ment 27 or allowing the transaction to occur in languages not under-
stood by all of the participating parties, 8 benefits may result from
tolerance of non-material deviation29 which does not threaten testa-
mentary security.2 The more modem jurisprudence surveyed above
thus provides a foundation for upholding a nuncupative testament by
public act when typed by the notary's secretary, though Knight v.
Smith,3 decided by the Louisiana supreme court early in the nine-
teenth century, held to the contrary.
23. 150 La. 256, 274, 90 So. 640, 646 (1922).
24. Comment, 12 TuL. L. REV. 439, 443 (1938).
25. LA. CIv. CODE art. 1578: "It must then be read to the testator .
26. "Any material deviation from the manner of execution prescribed by statute
will be fatal to the validity of the will." Soileau v. Ortego, 189 La. 713, 718, 180 So.
496, 497 (1938), citing 68 CORPUS JuRIS § 275. (Emphasis added.) See also Succession
of Thibodeaux, 238 La. 791, 807, 116 So. 2d 525, 530 (1959) (legal formalities must be
scrupulously observed in all essential respects); Succession of Payne, 25 La. Ann. 202,
205 (1873) (compliance with formalities declared to be sacramental).
27. Succession of Gauthreaux, 173 La. 993, 139 So. 322 (1932) (person held to be
incompetent as witness to nuncupative testament by public act when partial deafness
caused him to experience considerable difficulty in hearing and understanding).
28. Succession of Pardo, 22 La. Ann. 139 (1870) (witnesses must understand lan-
guage in which the will is dictated, and also language in which it is written); Heirs of
Bordelon v. Heirs of Baron, 11 La. Ann. 676 (1856) (notary must understand, without
aid of translator, language in which the will is dictated); Succession of Dauzet, 212
So. 2d 523 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1968) (testator must understand language in which the
will is read back).
29. See, e.g., Rostrup v. Succession of Spicer, 183 La. 1087, 165 So. 307 (1936)
(permitting notary to assist unlettered testator in accurately communicating his
wishes); Prudhomme v. Savant, 150 La. 256, 90 So. 640 (1922) (permitting notary to
type the testament).
30. "The formalities required by the law are indispensable . . . to the proper
making of testaments, but they are not snares and pitfalls by which the testator is to
be caught, and into which he must necessarily fall when he attempts to do with his
property what the law authorizes him to do with it. We are to sustain the will which
legally disposes of a testator's property, if we can, and not. . . pick it to pieces.
Succession of Payne, 25 La. Ann. 202, 205 (1873).
31. 3 Mart. (O.S.) 156 (1813) (nuncupative testament by public act held invalid
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In Killingsworth, consideration of the requirement that a nuncu-
pative testament by public act be written by a notary was obviated
on rehearing when the court ruled inadmissible testimony of two
witnesses that the notary's secretary had typed the testament. Prior
jurisprudence has established that witnesses can impeach their attes-
tations to a testament only if independent facts or reasonable infer-
ences exist to corroborate their testimony." On original hearing the
court found such an inference in the use of the word "revenue" rather
than "residue" in the testament, "where the latter rather than the
former word was obviously and logically intended."3 On the basis of
this semantic analysis, the court concluded that the legally untrained
secretary had typed the entire will, 4 and consequently held it to be
invalid. On rehearing, however, the court determined that a fair read-
ing of the will as a whole" revealed that the testatrix had employed
the term "revenue" to convey the same meaning intended by a prac-
ticing attorney using the term "residue."" Since "revenue" could be
because it had been written by the notary's clerk). Cf. King v. Vairin, 28 La. Ann. 452
(1876) (will held invalid because it had been written by one of the subscribing
witnesses).
32. Talton v. Todd, 233 La. 146, 96 So. 2d 327 (1957); Succession of Beattie, 163
La. 831, 112 So. 802 (1927). In Beattie the court held that the "[testimony of sub-
scribing witnesses which is adduced on the contest of the will and which, in effect,
impeaches the solemn statements contained in the instrument which by their signa-
tures they have attested as correct, is not in itself sufficient to overcome the presump-
tion of validity arising from their presence and signatures and the official certificate
of a public officer fortified by his oath. Their testimony must be corroborated by
independent facts or reasonable inferences .... Id. at 841, 112 So. at 805. See also
Civil Code and Related Subjects-Successions, Donations, and Community Property,
18 LA. L. REv. 33, 38 (1957).
33. Succession of Killingsworth, 292 So. 2d 536, 540 (La. 1973) rev'd on rehearing,
292 So. 2d 552 (La. 1974). The term was used in the twelfth clause of the will, the final
clause dealing with dispositions. The court stated that "the position in the testament
where the twelfth clause appears [is that at which] a testator would usually bequeath
the remainder of his estate in full ownership, the bequest of only the revenue of the
remainder, without disposing the naked ownership thereof, seems unusual." Id. at 555.
It also was contended by the legal heirs of Mrs. Killingsworth who were not named
legatees under the will that the use of the word "precede" in the will instead of the
work "predecease" constituted another reasonable inference that the will was typed
by someone other than the attorney-notary. The court found no merit to this
contention.
34. Id. at 540.
35. "It is well settled that when a particular provision of the will does not, stand-
ing alone, reveal the clear intent of the testator, we must take into consideration the
other clauses and the whole language of the will." Id. at 555.
36. "[Tlhe only asset remaining in the estate to be governed by the twelfth clause
of the will is cash. In addition, cash derived from the sale of property is often referred
to by a layman as revenue." Id.
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assigned a logical meaning in its context,37 the court declined to find
that it constituted a sufficient independent fact or reasonable infer-
ence to corroborate the negative testimony of the subscribing wit-
nesses and thus, the evidence was not admitted."
The majority opinion on original hearing, however, clearly indi-
cates that given proper evidentiary support, the court would declare
invalid a nuncupative testament by public act typed by the secretary,
if again squarely presented with that situation." Nevertheless, Jus-
tice Barham's dissent on original hearing' and Justice Tate's concur-
ring opinion on rehearing4l provide cogent argument for the opposite
result.
The advantages of finding such a testament valid when typed by
the secretary seem to outweigh any possible danger a ruling of valid-
ity might create. Sufficient protection from error,42 fraud43 or imposi-
tion4 4 is afforded by the double safeguards of oral execution in the
presence of competent witnesses, and by enforcement of the formali-
37. After fulfilling bequests of sums of money to certain named charities and
particular people, a bequest to the favored relatives would consist of the remaining
cash derived from the sale ordered by the testatrix of all of her property not bequeathed
under particular title. Id.
38. In reversing its prior determination of invalidity, the court no longer had to
deal with other significant issues of malpractice, prescriptive period, and coverage
afforded by professional liability insurance.
39. Succession of Killingsworth, 292 So. 2d 536 (La. 1973) (majority of six Justices
with one dissent).
40. Id. at 549 (Barham, J., dissenting).
41. Justice Tate expressed his agreement with Justice Barham's stance regarding
the logic of upholding such a will, but qualified his agreement with the reservation that
to follow such action "would, however, result in an unfortunate judicial pos-
ture-essentially a minority opinion of this court, founded on no rule of law deductible
for future guidance." Id. at 556 (Tate, J., concurring).
42. But see Succession of Crouzeilles, 106 La. 442, 31 So. 64 (1901) (court upheld
testament although notary misspelled testator's last name throughout will); Renfrow
v. McCain, 185 La. 135, 168 So. 753 (1936) (validity was not affected despite statement
in will that it was executed at office of notary when in fact it had been executed at
home of testator several miles from notary's office).
43. The Work of the Louisiana Appellate Courts for the 1965-1966
Term -Successions and Donations, 27 LA. L. REv. 442, 444 (1967): "The purpose of
the Civil Code articles prescribing the formalities which must be observed in the
confection of testaments is undoubtedly to guard against imposition, fraud, or decep-
tion .... " See also Stephens v. Adger, 227 La. 387, 79 So. 2d 491 (1955); Succession
of Michie, 183 So. 2d 436 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1966).
44. Of the cases researched by this writer, none were found in which the court
overturned a nuncupative testament by public act because of imposition. See Succes-
sions of Gilbert, 222 La. 840, 64 So. 2d 192 (1953), where evidence was held to be
insufficient to warrant a finding that any duress had been exerted upon decedent
testatrix at the time she executed the testament.
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ties other than writing by the notary. In addition, mechanical tran-
scription of the type employed in Killingsworth may fairly be viewed
as writing "by the notary." To distinguish legally between mechani-
cal transcription by the notary and mechanical transcription by his
secretary appears to be of little practical benefit, since both are simi-
larly neutral acts.45 The desired end, faithful transcription, should
not be confused with the means of accomplishing this end, which are
always subject to technological improvements.
Moreover, prohibition of the secretary's typing such a will pro-
duces negative results without comparable offsetting benefits. Notar-
ies capable of typing the testament are fearful of exercising this op-
tion, because typing, unlike writing, conveys none of the characteris-
tic identification of its author.4 Costs to the testator, moreover, are
greatly increased in this day of per-hour charges.47 The illegible na-
45. Future devices may even transcribe a speaker's voicewaves, a technique which
the Prudhomme rationale would apparently sanction. Cf. the method of transcription
of testimony presently under experimentation in the Nineteenth Judicial District
Court of East Baton Rouge Parish, Louisiana. The court reporter stenotypes the trial
testimony onto magnetic tape. The tape is then telecommunicated to Illinois where it
is translated into English onto another tape by a computer which is uniquely pro-
grammed to perform that task. The tape with the English translation is telecommuni-
cated to Baton Rouge, where another machine produces a typeout. The entire transac-
tion requires only a short period of time.
46. A challenge to the validity of a nuncupative testament by public act which
has been typed might be successful if a party could procure admissible testimony to
the effect that someone other than the notary had typed the will. This situation could
arise when, as in many instances, the will is offered for probate years after it is executed
and several of the attesting parties are deceased.
Where the notary's lack of compliance with the strict formalities of the nuncupa-
tive testament by public act causes the testament to be invalid, claims for reparation
from the notary's heirs and surviving law partner can be maintained. In Killingsworth,
the proponents of the will filed a plea of one year prescription in an attempt to bar
the claim for reparation. The court of appeals held that prescription in a case of this
nature does not commence to run until there is a final judgment decreeing the will to
be invalid, rather than commencing at the time the will was executed, or at the time
of the death of the testator. The Louisiana supreme court agreed that the plea of
prescription was properly overruled. However, it undercut this affirmation with regard
to the time at which such prescription will commence by stating that "[wihile we
would be inclined to hold that prescription did not commence to run against the
legatees any sooner than the date of Mrs. Killingsworth's death (in which event not
even the one year tort prescription would lie under the facts here) we need not so hold
since the prescription plea urged (one year) is not applicable to a contractual claim of
the third party beneficiary (The applicable prescription on a claim under contract is
10 years)." Succession of Killingsworth, 292 So. 2d 536, 545 (La. 1973) (Emphasis
added.) Note that if the prescriptive period applicable to such claims was held to
commence running only upon a final judgment decreeing the will invalid, potential
liability for the legal mishandling of a testament could subsist for generations.
47. If the attorney-notary charges by the hour, a will which he must either write
NOTES
ture of the script of many attorneys might prevent altogether the
carrying out of the testator's wishes, and a party may even die intes-
tate as the result of a notary's failure to comply with a non-essential
technicality. The result of all of these factors is that the nuncupative
testament by public act has fallen into disuse and may be obsolete
in light of modern office practice."
Lest this testamentary form be completely abandoned, the
applicable codal provisions should be revised, while maintaining
safeguards which are adequate to protect the interests of the testa-
tor. Adoption of the following suggested revision, patterned after
recent French legislation," would achieve this end:
Art. 1578. The nuncupative testaments by public act must
be received by a notary public, in the presence of three witnesses
residing in the place where the will is executed, or of five wit-
nesses not residing in the place.
This testament must be dictated by the testator; the notary
may write it himself or have it transcribed by hand or mechani-
cally.
It must then be read to the testator in the presence of the
witnesses.
Express mention is made of the whole, observing that all
those formalities must be fulfilled at one time, without interrup-
tion, and without turning aside to other acts.5"
In the event of legislative inaction, however, the courts may
again be faced with interpreting the present codal provisions. In other
instances our courts have acknowledged the importance of perceiving
the spirit as well as the letter of the Code" and it is hoped that this
in longhand or type can cost the testator as much as several hundred dollars. However,
to permit the secretary to type the testament would significantly reduce this amount.
48. "[The nuncupative testament by public act, with all its formalities, is too
rigid a form to be truly useful .... Unless the essentials of the form are reinterpreted
... this code form must be regarded as made obsolete by modern office practices."
Succession of Killingsworth, 292 So. 2d 536, 557 (La. 1974) (Tate, J., concurring). As
early as 1938, this form of testamentary disposition was seldom used because of its rigid
formalities. See Comment, 12 TuL. L. REV. 439, 446 (1938).
49. French Law of 25 Vent~se An XL
50. The value of the last provision of Louisiana Civil Code article 1578 has perhaps
been offset by the extent of unnecessary litigation which it has engendered. Should
legislative consideration be given to amending this article, it is suggested that a study
be undertaken to evaluate the advantages of also changing the last provision of this
article to read simply: "Express mention is made of the observing of all these formali-
ties."
51. "The development of our mineral law is an example frequently given of the
application by the Louisiana courts of ancient Code concepts to changed economic and
19741
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attitude will be extended to the area of testamentary dispositions.
Charles Laurence Spencer
social conditions for which the Code did not provide." Tate, Techniques of Judicial
Interpretation in Louisiana, 22 LA. L. REV. 727, 738 (1962). See also LA. CIv. CODE art.
667, as discussed in Barham, A Renaissance of the Civilian Tradition in Louisiana, 33
LA. L. REv. 357, 381 (1973); Yiannopoulos, Civil Responsibility in the Framework of
Vicinage: Articles 667-669 and 2315 of the Civil Code, 48 TuL. L. REV. 195 (1974);
Yiannopoulos, Violations of the Obligations of Vicinage: Remedies Under Articles 667
and 669, 34 LA. L. REV. 475 (1974).
